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Trying to Make Sense of the Contemporary Debate on State-building: 
The Legitimacy and the Institutional Approaches on State, State 
Collapse and State-building 
 
Nicolas Lemay-Hébert
1
 
 
Abstract: Drawing upon the vast contemporary literature on state-building that has 
emerged since Helman and Ratner’s pioneer article in 1992-1993, this paper identifies 
two different schools of thought in the discussion, each of which reflects different 
sociological understandings of the state. The first one, an “institutional approach” 
closely related to the Weberian conception of the state, focuses on the importance of 
institutional reconstruction and postulates that state-building activities do not necessarily 
require a concomitant nation-building effort. The second, a “legitimacy approach” 
influenced by Durkheimian sociology, recognizes the need to consolidate central state 
institutions, but puts more emphasis on the importance of socio-political cohesion in the 
process. The institutional approach focuses on the institutional and physical basis of the 
state, while the legitimacy approach is more preoccupied with the social contract binding 
the citizens together. This contemporary debate has practical implications for 
practitioners in the field of state-building. Indeed, one’s conception of what to rebuild – 
the state – will necessarily impact the actual process of state-building. This paper tries to 
bring some clarity to a very confused debate, detailing the rise of the institutional 
approach and its limits when faced with unforeseen legitimacy issues. 
 
Introduction: Addressing the state, state collapse and state-building  
There is a wide consensus between political analysts and practitioners concerning 
the importance of the state collapse phenomenon in contemporary world politics. Indeed, 
in light of the growing number of intra-state conflicts, the central cause of war in the 
present international system stems not from the security dilemma inherent in an 
anarchical international system, but rather in crises of state legitimacy in weak and failed 
states.
2
 According to the latest issue of the SIPRI Yearbook, state weakness is now among 
the most critical factor stimulating armed violence.
3
  
                                                 
1
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Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, University of Quebec in Montreal, and 
Research associate at the Center for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa. 
2
 After brilliantly demonstrating that yesterday‘s wars were anchored in interstate rivalry, Kalevi 
Hosti states that today‘s wars are ―less a problem of the relations between states than a problem 
within states. New and weak states are the primary locale of present and future wars. Thus, war as 
a problem that commanded the attention of experts in strategy and international relations is now 
becoming a problem better addressed by students of the state creation and sustenance processes.‖ 
See: Kalevi Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order: 1648-1989 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of 
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However, because the concept of ―state collapse‖ seems so obvious and clear, few 
have attempted to dwell on the concept in itself. As a result, a growing number of 
scholars, practitioners, and analysts point to the significant challenges to international 
security posed by failed and failing states without coming to a common definition of the 
phenomenon. Conceptual vagueness is reflected in the proliferation of terminologies 
concerning the state collapse phenomenon – e.g. collapsed state, failed state, fragile state, 
imaginary state, lame Leviathan, gentle state, mashed potato state
4
 – as well as 
concerning the process of tackling this issue – peace-enforcement, peace-maintenance, 
peace-building.
5
 This conceptual ambiguity is no doubt linked to the international 
                                                                                                                                                 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xi. See also Mary Kaldor who considers 
that what she calls the new wars ―arise in the context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state 
and in some extreme cases the disintegration of the state.‖ Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 5.These analyses have also found an echo in the practitioner‘s world. 
For instance, the National Security Guidelines of September 2002 considered failed states as 
henceforth a greater threat than states that have ambitions of conquest: ―America is now 
threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.‖ Interestingly enough, this report 
came amid a period of heightened tension between the People‘s Republic of China (Mainland 
China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan), concerning the politics of the Taiwanese president 
Chen Shui-bian. National Security Council, National Security Strategy 2002, September 2002, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html (last accessed November 13 2008).  
3
 Ekaterina Stepanova, ―Trends in Armed Conflicts‖ in SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 71.   
4
 For a review of the different expressions used to describe the state collapse phenomenon, see: 
Atieno Odhiambo, ―The Economics of Conflict among Marginalized Peoples of Eastern Africa‖ 
in Conflict Resolution in Africa, ed. Francis Deng and William Zartman (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1991), 294 [quoted in Holsti, State, the War and the State of War, 104 
(footnote 2)]. In this work, I will prefer the use of the term ―state collapse‖ over the others, 
especially because it appears more value-neutral. In that regard, I totally agree with Alexandros 
Yannis, who states that the term ―failed state,‖ endorsed originally by authoritative figures as the 
previous UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the former US Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright and widely used after September 11, ―can mislead if it is understood to imply 
a value judgement that there are specific standards of social, political and economic performance 
and success to which all states should aspire (…). Moreover, the picture portrayed when ‗failed 
state‘ is used is one of societal failure. This automatically attributes the entire political 
responsibility and moral liability for state collapse to local communities – generating a moral 
justification for outside intervention to assist those who have failed.‖ Alexandros Yannis, ―State 
Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction‖ in State Failure, Collapse 
and Reconstruction, 64.  
5
 For the sake of clarity, peace-maintenance is a concept brought forward by Jarat Chopra, former 
UN official. See : Jarat Chopra, ―The Space of Peace-Maintenance,‖ Political Geography, 15, . 3-
4 (March-April 1996): 335-357; Jarat Chopra, ―Introducing Peace-Maintenance‖ in The Politics 
of Peace-Maintenance, ed. Jarat Chopra (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 1-18. The notion of 
peace-enforcement seems to follow from the works of two former UN officials, Brian Urquhart 
on the one hand and by Jarat Chopra along with John Mackinlay on the other hand, who 
advocated a ―third category of international military operation (...) somewhere between 
peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement.‖ The notion has been endorsed later on by the former 
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community‘s unease when dealing with specific cases of state collapse. As Alexandros 
Yannis points out, ―the evident frustration of international society when facing the 
phenomenon of state collapse can be attributed to the lack of precise conceptions about 
state disintegration, and the absence of comprehensive international mechanisms to 
respond effectively to the challenges posed by the disappearance of effective central 
governments and the emergence of powerful non-state actors.‖6 
 
Hence, I initially propose to return to the literature concerning state-building to 
better understand the phenomenon of state collapse and the challenges it poses to the 
international community. I address the literature on state-building by distinguishing 
between two approaches, fundamentally differentiated by their conception of the state. 
An institutional approach focuses on the institutions of the state, while a legitimacy 
approach is more concerned with socio-political cohesion and the legitimacy central 
authorities can generate; whereas the former emphasizes efficiency of state institutions, 
the latter focuses on their legitimacy and the social contract binding underpinning it. I 
will first briefly outline the two approaches, and I will then look at their implications, 
which will enable me to demonstrate later on how this discussion has direct implications 
on the way the state-building issues are tackled concretely.  
 
The institutional approach 
Every scholarly contribution on state-building adopts, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, a definition of what it intends to reconstruct: a definition of the state. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace. Brian Urquhart, Who 
Can Stop Civil Wars?, The New York Times, December 29 1991, sec. E; John Mackinlay and 
Jarat Chopra, ―Second Generation Multinational Operations,‖ The Washington Quarterly, 15, no. 
2 (spring 1992), 118 [articles quoted in Glen-Steven Macdonald, ―Peace Enforcement: Mapping 
the ‗Middle Ground‘ in Peace Operations,‖ PhD diss., HEI-Geneva, 2001 (footnote 61)]; United 
Nations, An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (Report 
of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992), UN. Doc. A/47/277 and S/24/111, 17 June 1992. para. 44. 
The notion of peace-building has been introduced by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in an Agenda for 
Peace, stating that peacebuilding is an ―action to identify and support structures that will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.‖ United Nations, An 
Agenda for Peace, 46. However, since then, ―peacebuilding‖ has become a broadly used but often 
ill-defined term connoting activities that go beyond crisis intervention such as longer-term 
development, and building of governance structures and institutions, to the extent that Roland 
Paris states that nowadays ―there is no universally accepted definition of peacebuilding‖ while 
Charles-Philippe David considers that ―there being as many visions of peacebuilding as they are 
experts on the issue and actors on the field.‖ Roland Paris, ―Broadening the Study of Peace 
Operations,‖ International Studies Review 2, no. 3 (Fall 2000), 33 (footnote 18); Charles-Philippe 
David, ―Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?‖ Security Dialogue 30, no. 1 (March 1999), 27. 
Definitions will be discussed more thoroughly in the first chapter, section II.  
6
 Yannis, ―State collapse and its implications,‖ 69.  
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this regard, the Weberian approach to statehood is the starting point for a number of 
analyses. Weber famously defines the state ―as a human community that successfully 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.‖7 
Following this definition, the state‘s ability to provide security is the benchmark 
according to which each state can be judged. Besides security, other criteria also have to 
be taken into account, all related to the capabilities of the state to secure its grip on 
society. Tenants of what I dub the ―institutional approach‖ tend to focus on the 
administrative capability of the state and the ability of the state apparatus to affirm its 
authority over the society.  
 
The term ―failed state‖ came to prominence in the contemporary academic and 
policy discourse with the publication of Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner‘s article, 
―Saving Failed States,‖ who defined the failed state as ―a situation where governmental 
structures are overwhelmed by circumstances.‖8 This does not mean that state collapse 
phenomena only started to take shape after 1992-1993. Certain elements that are now 
subsumed into the larger category of collapsed states were present before this date, but 
their analysis was obscured by the ideological veil cast upon the discipline of 
international relations at this time.
9
 Thus, the end of the cold war unveiled the true nature 
of intrastate conflicts in a sense, and allowed scholars to start new reflections about their 
causes and consequences. In that context, Helman and Ratner‘s article constituted 
arguably one of the first attempts to cope with the ―failed state‖ phenomenon in a post-
cold war world.
10
 Moreover, Helman and Ratner‘s work is also the first major work 
                                                 
7
 Max Weber, ―Politics as a Vocation‖ in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. Hans Gerth 
and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), 78.  
8
 Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, ―Saving Failed States‖, Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93), 
5.  
9
 It worth pointing out that the concept of ―weak state,‖ used in its contemporary sense, can be 
traced back as far as 1915, when Walter Lippmann, adviser to the President Woodrow Wilson, 
wrote that ―the chief overwhelming problem of international diplomacy seems to be weak states. 
Weak because they are industrially backward and at present politically incompetent to prevent 
outbreaks of internal violence.‖ David C. Ropoport, ―The Role of External Forces in Supporting 
Ethno-Religious Conflict‖ in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. 
Policy and Army Roles and Missions, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff et Richard H. Schultz Jr. (Carlisle: 
US Army War College, 1994), 59. 
10
 According to Martin Doornbos, the UN begun to tackle the theoretical issue of ―rebuilding 
wartorn societies‖ in the context of collapsing state in 1993, thus following Helman and Ratner‘s 
article. For instance, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) 
convened its first research-preparatory workshop on this theme in April 1993. The United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) developed a program on ―Linking Rehabilitation to 
Development: Management Revitalization of Wartorn Societies‖ around the same time. Also 
noteworthy, these tentative efforts to tackle the issue of collapsing states coincided with the actual 
collapse of Somalia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Martin Doornbos, 
―State Formation and Collapse; Reflections on Identity and Power ,‖ in Pivot Politics: Changing 
Cultural Identities in Early State Formation Processes, ed. Martin van Bakel, Renée Hagesteijn 
and Pieter van de Velde (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1994), note 1, 281.  
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exemplifying what we call the ―institutional approach,‖ as their pioneering definition 
emphatically revolves around governmental institutions. Helman and Ratner‘s work is 
also considered authoritative. As Ralph Wilde pointed out, ―Helman and Ratner‘s article 
continues to enjoy widespread currency as a way of denoting situations where the 
governmental infrastructure in a state has broken down to a considerable degree.‖11  
 
Building on Helman and Ratner‘s work, other scholars have helped clarify the 
notion of collapsed state. For instance, Robert Rotberg, director of the Failed States 
Project at Harvard University, has provided a clear definition of the state in his work, 
allowing him to put forward a more precise notion of state collapse. In the purest 
functionalist tradition, he states that ―nation-states exist to provide a decentralized 
method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated 
parameters (borders).‖12 He continues, asserting that ―it is according to their 
performances—according to the levels of their effective delivery of the most crucial 
political goods—that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states 
from failed or collapsed.‖13 For the author, public goods encompass the supply of 
security, a transparent and equitable political process, medical and health care, schools 
and education, railways, harbours, and even a beneficent fiscal and institutional context 
within which citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals. Hence, according to his 
model, 
 
strong states obviously perform well across these categories and with respect to 
each, separately. Weak states show a mixed profile, fulfilling expectations in 
some areas and performing poorly in others. The more poorly weak states 
perform, criterion by criterion, the weaker they become and the more that 
weakness tends to edge toward failure.
14
 
 
 Rotberg‘s functionalist focus on the provision of public goods has been shared by 
other subsequent authors.
15
 For example, Stuart Eizenstat, John E. Porter and Jeremy 
                                                 
11
 Ralph Wilde, ―The Skewed Responsibility Narrative of the ‗Failed States‘ Concept‖, ILSA 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 9 (Winter 2002-2003), 425.  
12
 Robert Rotberg, ―The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States‖ In When States Fail: Causes and 
Consequences, ed. Robert Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid., 4. According to the author, state collapse is defined as an extreme case of state failure: ―It 
is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. There is dark 
energy, but the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some 
semblance of order and other vital political goods to the inhabitants (no longer the citizens).‖ 
Ibid., 9. 
15
 For Derick Brinkerhoff, ―while definitions of fragile states vary, all concur that state fragility is 
directly related to capacity deficits.‖ Derick Brinkerhoff, ―Where There‘s a Will, There‘s a Way? 
Untangling Ownership and Political Will in Post-Conflict Stability and Reconstruction 
Operations,‖ The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations (Winter-Spring 
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Weinstein contend that ―the weakness of these states can be measured according to lapses 
in three critical functions that the governments of all strong, stable states perform: 
security, the provision of basic services, and protection of essential civil freedoms.‖16 As 
for Martin Doornbos, Susan Woodward and Silvia Roque, they define failing states as 
―states incapable to fulfil the basic tasks of providing security for their populace.‖17  
 
Demonstrating how this approach has had far-reaching impacts, even Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali defines state collapse as ―the collapse of state institutions, especially the 
police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and 
order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government 
suspended, but its assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or 
flee the country.‖18 The concept of ―fragile states,‖ put forth by the United Kingdom‘s 
Department for International Development (DFID), is yet another example in the 
practitioner‘s world. Fragile states ―have governments that cannot or will not deliver core 
functions to the majority of its people.‖19 Similarly, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) indicates that ―states are fragile when state 
structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for 
poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their 
populations (italics added),‖20 even if the OECD, maybe more than any other 
international organizations, incorporates legitimacy aspects in its analysis.
21 
                                                                                                                                                 
2007), 
http://diplomacy.shu.edu/academics/journal/resources/journal_dip_pdfs/journal_of_diplomacy_v
ol8_no1/09-Brinkerhoff.pdf (last accessed 16 July 2009), 111. 
16
 They added that ―failed‖ states do not fulfill any of these functions, but even ―weak‖ states, 
which are deficient in one of two of these areas, can still threaten US interests. Stuart Eizenstat, 
John Porter and Jeremy Weinstein, ―Rebuilding Weak States,‖ Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (January-
February 2005), 136. 
17
 Martin Doornbos, Susan Woodward and Silvia Roque, Failing States of Failed States? The 
Role of Development Models: Collected Works (Madrid: FRIDE, February 2006), 2.  
18
 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Concluding Statement of the UN Congress on Public International 
Law: ―Towards the Twenty-First Century: International Law as a Language for International 
Relations,‖ 13-17 March 1995, New York, 9 [quoted in Daniel Thürer, ―The Failed State and 
International Law,‖ International Review of the Red Cross 836 (1999), 731.   
19
 Department for International Development, ―Fragile States,‖ http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Global-
Issues/How-we-fight-Poverty/Government/Fragile-States/ (last accessed 19 June 2009).  
20
 OECD, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, April 
2007, para. 3. See also: OECD, Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings 
and Lessons, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper, 2008, 7.   
21
 At least, it does in further reports. For instance, it states quite accurately that ―in practical and 
political terms, international actors have tended to focus either on capacity or will, perhaps 
reflecting the instruments available to them. Relatively few incorporate questions of legitimacy in 
any operational sense. Each of these, however – capacity,will, legitimacy – is critical to a more 
accurate and dynamic understanding of fragility and its causes.‖ OECD, Concepts and Dilemmas 
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Francis Fukuyama‘s influential State-building: governance and world order in the 
21
st
 Century also provides a good and detailed example of what I call the ―institutional 
approach.‖ In order to understand what precisely a ―weak state‖ is, the author clarifies 
two concepts. He defines the strength of state as ―the ability of states to plan and execute 
policies and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently—what is now commonly referred 
to as state or institutional capacity,‖ and distinguishes it from the scope of state, ―which 
refers to the different functions and goals taken on by government.‖22 This distinction 
allows Fukuyama to differentiate a decrease in the scope of state institutions in the 
context of globalization from the more problematic aspect of weak state institutions. 
From this perspective, a weak state is a political entity that lacks the institutional capacity 
to implement and enforce policies; state-building is the creation of new government 
institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.
23
 Interestingly enough, the 
institutional approach is so pervasive that even some authors who claim not to take a 
stance end up adopting it. For example, in Making States Work, Sebastian von Einsiedel 
asserts that ―for present purposes, no attempt will be made at a final definition of the term 
‗failed state.‘ Much ink has been spilled on developing typologies of the forms of state 
failure, using either the degree of failure or its cause as a criterion. Instead, this volume 
treats state failure as a continuum of circumstances that afflict states with weak 
institutions (italics added).‖24  
 
The legitimacy approach: socio-political cohesion and the state 
Failure to perform the functions of statehood clearly enters into the phenomenon of 
state collapse. Response to it is certainly part of any effective solution. However, the re-
establishment of effective state institutions, notably the security institutions, is only one 
aspect of a long-lasting solution. Hence, as it has been asserted by Holsti, while 
institutionalization and the instrumental capacities of statehood are important, it can be 
argued that ―it is in the realm of ideas and sentiment that the fate of states is primarily 
determined.‖25 This highlights a very different conception of the state than the one 
adopted by institutionalists. While accepting the institutional approach‘s focus on the 
security apparatus and state institutions, especially as a critical first step in state-building 
processes, the tenants of the ―legitimacy approach‖ adds a layer of complexity in drawing 
                                                                                                                                                 
of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, OECD/DAC Discussion 
Paper, 2008, 16. 
22
 Francis Fukuyama, State-building : Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 7.  
23
 Fukuyama, State-building, ix.  
24
 Sebastian Von Einsiedel, ―Policy Response to state failure‖ in Making States Work: State 
Failure and the Crisis of Governance, ed. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh 
Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 16.  
25
 Holsti, The State, the War and the State of War, 84.  
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attention to the state‘s underlying legitimacy. The strength of the state is defined in terms 
of ―the capacity of state to command loyalty—the right to rule.‖26 Hence, as Scott Pegg 
underscores, ―the term weak state refers to states that are lacking in legitimacy and socio-
political cohesion, not states that are lacking in power.‖27  
 
This approach stems from a different conception of the state. One good example is 
Barry Buzan, who puts emphasis on the ―idea of the state,‖ assuming integration between 
the territorial, societal and political aspects of the state. For Buzan, the state exists 
primarily on the socio-political rather than on the physical plane: ―in some important 
senses, the state is more an idea held in common by a group of people, than it is a 
physical organism.‖28 In this approach, the state is composed of three different elements, 
each crucial to understand the strength of states: the physical base of the state (effective 
sovereignty, international consensus on territorial limits); the institutional expression of 
the state (consensus on political ―rules of the game‖ but also scope of state institutions); 
and the idea of the state (implicit social contract and ideological consensus pertaining to a 
given society).
29
 The first two elements are subsumed within the institutional approach. 
However, the focus on the idea of the state is specific to the legitimacy approach. 
According to the tenants of the legitimacy approach, if a state cannot exist without a 
physical base, as the institutionalists stress, the reverse is also true. As Buzan posits, 
―without a widespread and quite deeply rooted idea of the state among the population, the 
state institutions themselves have difficulty functioning and surviving.‖30  
 
Figure 1: the state, according to Holsti and Buzan 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., 82.  
27
 Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 132.  
28
 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear : An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf., 1991), 63.  
29
 Ibid., 64; Holsti, State, the War, and the State of War, 98.  
30
 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 64.  
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Source: Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, 98. 
 
Figure 2: differences between the institutional and the legitimacy approaches 
 
The legitimacy approach is more coherent with the Durkheimian conception of the 
state than a strictly Weberian one. For Durkheim, the state ―is the very organ of social 
thought,‖ it comprises ―the sentiments, ideals, beliefs that the society has worked out 
collectively and with time.‖31 The collective conscience is distinct from individual 
                                                 
31
 Emile Durkheim, ―The Concept of State‖ in Durkheim on Politics and the State, ed. Anthony 
Giddens (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), 54. See also: Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and 
Civic Morals (London: Routledge, 1957), 79-80; Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in 
Society (New York: Free Press, 1964), 79.  
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consciences, and, although it is diffuse in every society, the collective conscience has 
specific characteristics which make it a distinct reality: ―it is, in effect, independent of the 
particular conditions in which individuals are placed: they pass on and it remains.‖32 For 
him, the division of labor and the development of organic solidarity paralleled the 
development of contract and the state. However, and contrary to Weber‘s conception of 
the state, Durkheim states that the coercive powers of the state could vary independently 
of the level of social development.
33
 The political society is neither primarily determined 
by possession of a fixed territorial area nor by density of population, but by the act of 
―coming together‖ to use Durkheim‘s own words.34  
 
Furthermore, to put in perspective the conceptual differences between the two 
schools of thought herein defined, one has to understand that the different approaches 
stem basically from different understanding of the concept of ―state.‖ As Anthony 
Giddens observes ―the ―state‖ sometimes means an apparatus of government or power, 
sometimes the overall social system subject to that government or power.‖35 This 
difference in definitions is at the root of the distinction between the two approaches, and 
the tenants of the legitimacy approach tend to follow Durkheim‘s attempt to eliminate the 
antithesis between the state and society. 
 
The legitimacy approach has a number of implications concerning how one should 
regard state collapse. First of all, state collapse is not only driven by institutional collapse 
per se, but by the collapse of the legitimacy of the central authority. The collapse of 
legitimate governance opens the door to ―political entrepreneurs,‖ allowing them to 
mobilize sectors of the population on the basis of allegiances competing with national 
ones. Building on Buzan‘s conception of the state, Holsti defines the strength of the state 
as the capacity to command loyalty. A collapsed state is one where ―authority fragments 
or evaporates in direct proportion to the loss of governmental legitimacy in society and its 
component groups. Rule—to the extent that it exists – is based on coercion, corruption or 
terror. It is no longer a right.‖36 William Zartman synthesizes the argument of the tenants 
of the legitimacy approach with is oft-quoted definition of the state collapse:  
 
                                                 
32
 Durkeim, The Division of Labor, 80.  
33
 Emile Durkheim, ―The Two Laws of Penal Evolution,‖ Economy and Society 2, no. 3 (August 
1973), 285-308 [quoted in Irving Horowitz, ―Socialization without Politicization: Emile 
Durkheim‘s Theory of the Modern State,‖ Political Theory 10, no. 3 (August 1982), 365]. For a 
critique of this aspect of Durkheim‘s work, see: Melvin Richter, ―Durkheim‘s Politics and 
Political Theory,‖ in Emile Durkheim: 1858-1917, ed. Kurt Wolff (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1960), 192-193.  
34
 Durkheim, Professional Ethics, 45. 
35
 Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), 17.  
36
 Kalevi Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics, 
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2004, 56-57. 
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situations where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political 
order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new. […] 
As the authoritative political institution, it [the collapsed state] has lost its 
legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so has lost its right to command 
and conduct public affairs. […].37 
 
  Hence, the challenge of building and consolidating state institutions aside, one the 
most important issues is for the indigenous institutions to define, create, and solidify a 
viable collective identity in order to provide the social bond necessary for them to be 
recognized as legitimate by the citizens, and, by extent, for the external actors to find 
efficient and unobtrusive ways to support this process. The problems faced by recently 
decolonized states in the 1960s, as identified by anthropologist Clifford Geertz, are to a 
certain extent similar to those facing current weak states: ―it consists in defining, or 
trying to define, a collective subject to whom the actions of the state can be internally 
connected, in creating, or trying to create, an experiential ‗we‘ from whose will the 
activities of government seem spontaneously to flow.‖38 This goal can be hindered by 
legacies of bad governance from colonial powers in the case of decolonized states, which 
can then lead to neopatrimonial practices in newly created states or states striving to 
define their identity.
39
 Hence, failure to create and nurture this ―collective subject‖ can 
lead to a wide variety of problems. As Lloyd Fallers argued more than thirty years ago, 
―since nation-states are internally differentiated in so many dimensions, heightened self-
consciousness causes diverse solidarities to stimulate each other by opposition, to 
challenge each other and may even threaten the integrity of the nation-state itself if these 
solidarities, felt to be crucial, are insufficiently represented in the politics and culture of 
the state.‖40  
 
By putting emphasis not only on the degree of institutionalization of the state but 
also on the socio-political cohesiveness of the state and the factors influencing it, the 
authors following the legitimacy approach are bringing a new dimension to the state-
building debate, without necessarily neglecting the importance of governmental 
institutions. Rejoining the Durkheimian sociological tradition by putting emphasis on 
logics of social integration and solidarity, and a contrario on logics of anomie,
41
 and not 
                                                 
37
 William Zartman, ―Introduction: Posing the problem of state collapse‖ in Collapsed States: The 
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995). 1-5.  
38
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 238-240.  
39
 Bertrand Badie, The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Orders (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 14-24. 
40
 Lloyd Fallers, The Social Anthropology of the Nation-State (Chicago: Aldine, 1974), 4. 
41
 We refer here to Durkheim‘s second conception of anomie, elaborated in his Suicide. His first 
conception, conceived in The Division of Labor in Society refers to anomie as an inadequate 
procedural rules to regulate complementary relationship among the specialized and 
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only the Weberian logics of state capacity, they impose a salutary debate to the field of 
political science.  
 
State-building as institutional reconstruction: the limits of the institutional 
approach 
 Conceiving state collapse as a breakdown of government institutions, as 
institutionalists will contend, allows one to identify failed or failing states according to 
institutional strength. In Fukuyama‘s words, ―distinguishing between these two 
dimensions of stateness [scope and strength] allows us to create a matrix that helps 
differentiate the degrees of stateness in a variety of countries around the world.‖42 
Similarly, Rotberg uses a performance indicator comprising the functions that states 
perform.
43
 The State Failure Task Force, established by then vice-president Al Gore and 
funded by the CIA, claims to forecast state failure with a degree of exactitude of around 
70 to 80 percent.
44
 Other indexes provide different lists of failing states, according to 
their own criteria for measurement of state performance.
45
   
                                                                                                                                                 
breakdown in moral norms, which ―springs from the lack of collective forces at certain points in 
society.‖ Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, trans. by John Spaulding and George 
Simpson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 382. See also, Robert McIver‘s interpretation 
of anomie which he defines as ―the breakdown of the individual‘s sense of attachment to society.‖ 
Robert MacIver, The Ramparts We Guard (New York: MacMillan, 1950), 84. For a discussion of 
the difference between the two conceptions of anomie in Durkheim‘s work, see: Marvin Olsen, 
―Durkheim‘s Two Concepts of Anomie,‖ in Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments Vol. II, ed. 
Peter Hamilton (London: Routledge, 1990), 47-54.  
42
 Fukuyama, State building, 7.  
43
 Rotberg, ―The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States,‖ 2. 
44
 Jack Goldstone et al. State Failure Task Force Report : Phase III Findings. (McLean: Science 
Applications International Corporation, 2000), v. Interestingly enough, some use the medicine 
reference in order to exemplify how we should be able to forecast state failure. After defining 
state failure in institutional terms (unable to control its territory and guarantee the security of its 
citizens, maintain the rule of law and deliver public goods to its population), Jack Straw stated in 
a speech that ―in medicine, doctors look at a wide range of indicators to spot patients who are at 
high risk of certain medical conditions – high cholesterol, bad diet, heavy smoking for example. 
This does not mean they ignore everyone else nor that some of those exhibiting such 
characteristics are not able to enjoy long and healthy lives, against our expectations. But this 
approach does enable the medical profession to narrow down the field and focus their effort 
accordingly. We should do the same with countries.‖ Jack Straw, ―Failed and Failing States,‖ 
speech given at the European Research Institute, University of Birmingham, 6 September 2002. 
45
 World Bank, Engaging with Fragile States (Washington: The World Bank, 2006); US 
Department of State, Framework for US Foreign Assistance, July 10 2007, 
http://www.state.gov/f/c23053.htm (accessed November 16 2008); Monty Marshall and Benjamin 
Cole, ―Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2008‖, Foreign Policy Bulletin 
18, no. 1 (Winter 2008); Fund for Peace, ―The Failed States Index 2008‖, Foreign Policy 167 
(July/August 2008); Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing 
World (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2008); Department for International Development 
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In these works, the Western states set a standard against which other states are 
measured. We could argue along with Ralph Wilde that ―just as Edward Said studied 
‗Orientalism‘ inter alia as a way of understanding how Western culture conceives itself 
through an alienated, oriental ‗other,‘ the failed state concept may be illuminating insofar 
as our understandings of those who use it are concerned.‖46 Indeed, as Jennifer Milliken 
and Keith Krause observe, ―concern over the possibility of state failure often has as much 
to do with dashed expectations about the achievement of modern statehood, or the 
functions that modern states should fulfil, as it does with the empirically-observed 
decomposition or collapse of the institutions of governance in different parts of the 
world.‖47 ―Failed states‖ are thus understood as falling short of specific standards of 
social, political and economic performance. As Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta stated 
 
Many comparative and classificatory analyses of states, such as those that rank 
states as ―weak‖ or ―strong,‖ effectively strip the unit of analysis – the state – 
from its cultural moorings. When a state does not have a fully developed set of 
functional elements or if such elements are completely absent, that nation-state is 
classified as having a ―transitioning‖ or ―weak‖ state or a ―stateless‖ society. In 
addition such exercises take for granted that ―fully developed‖ and ―ideal‖ states 
are Western liberal democratic ones. Western states are thus often employed as 
the norm against which other states are judged; the criteria for ―strong‖ state are 
almost always those that apply to a specific subset of Western nation-states.
48
 
 
In this context, the expression ―failed or failing state‖ seems to be a convenient 
neologism describing nothing more than a state with low-standards of living, a country 
that has not attained the same level of development – measured as the public goods 
provision of state institutions – as the ―developed world‖. Hence, peacebuilding is 
increasingly seen as a new mission civilisatrice, as an ―act to bring war-shattered states 
into conformity with the international system‘s prevailing standards of domestic 
governance.‖49   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(DFID), Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States (London: Department for 
International Development, January 2005).  
46
 Wilde, ―The Skewed Responsibility,‖ 428.  
47
 Milliken and Krause, ―State failure, state collapse, and state reconstruction,‖ 1-2. Similarly, 
Serge Latouche attributes the state failure to the ―West and its universalist pretensions.‖ Serge 
Latouche, The Westernization of the World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 103. 
48
 Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, ―Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age 
of Globalization,‖ in The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, ed. Aradhana Sharma and Akhil 
Gupta (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 10-11. 
49
 Roland Paris, ―International Peacebuilding and the ‗Mission Civilisatrice‘‖, Review of 
International Studies 28, no. 4 (October 2002), 638.  
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Different attempts to map state failure point, in large, to poor countries; the 
juxtaposition of a poverty map and a failing states map generally corroborates this 
analysis.
50
 The commonly used DFID‘s ―fragile state‖ is clearly linked to income in 
countries. The DFID states that  
 
one common way to estimate the level of fragility is derived from the World 
Bank‘s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA). CPIA scores divide 
low-income countries into five categories of performance, the lowest two of 
which are useful proxies for state fragility. There is a separate group of unranked 
countries, also deemed fragile. This provides a list of 46 fragile states, containing 
870 million people or 14% of the world‘s population. Middle-income countries 
are not included in this list.
51
 
 
Moreover, none of the above approaches list seemingly ―strong‖ states that still have 
serious problems in defining their identity, such as Belgium, Spain (in its relations with 
the Basque country and Catalonia), Canada (with Quebec) or the United Kingdom 
(especially during the conflict in Northern Ireland). Even if it could be problematic to 
consider them as potentially failing states, or even as weak states, the question remains: 
which criterion should one take into account in defining state strength? Should criteria 
only encompass the institutional capabilities of the state, or should they encompass other 
fundamental aspects of ―stateness‖? 
 
A second implication of the institutional approach for state-building practices is 
related to the policy prescriptions that follow from this approach. Since in this conception 
a ―state‖ is synonymous with ―central government,‖ the state-building process aims 
mainly to strengthen government institutions. For Fukuyama ―the underlying problems 
caused by failed states or weak governance can only be solved through long-term efforts 
by outside powers to rebuild indigenous state institutions.‖52 This approach minimalizes 
the social impacts of such policies. Hence, this project and the institutional approach in 
general tend to differentiate between state- and nation-building, arguing that it is possible 
to conduct state-building operations from the outside without entering into the contested 
sphere of nation-building. In other words, it is possible to target the institutions of a given 
state, to reconstruct the state capabilities, without engaging in the realm of socio-political 
cohesion of ―society‖ in general. In that sense, state-building becomes a scientific, 
                                                 
50
 According to Maria Ottaway and Stefan Mair, ―there is hardly a low-income country that does 
not face the possibility of failure‖. Maria Ottaway and Stefan Mair, States at Risk and Failed 
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 Fukuyama, ―Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,‖ Nation Building 
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technical and administrative process.
53
 Not surprising, then, is the state-building 
literature‘s striking neglect of politics; what is, in fact, a highly political process becomes 
depoliticized through a focus on state capacity-building, where concerns of stability and 
regulation are discussed in a narrow technical and functionalist framework.
54
 In that 
regard, there are interesting similarities between the state-building and development 
literature, defined as an ‗anti-politics machine‘ by James Ferguson.55  
 
The narrow understanding of the institutional approach can also lead to another 
bias, in which one recognizes the need for a more thorough state-building process that 
encompasses nation-building, while at the same time leaving aside the issue of legitimacy 
in the process. The Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building, defines nation-building as ―the 
use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms 
with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with 
itself and its neighbors.‖56 The hurdles of this ―transformation‖ are barely addressed. 
Hence, society is objectified, portrayed as an entity as tangible as any dimension of the 
state. While facilitating policy prescriptions, such analysis lacks a crucial dimension of 
the understanding of stateness and state-building, namely legitimacy.  
 
In general, the legitimacy approach is more sociologically or anthropologically-
oriented, distancing itself from generalizing assumptions and emphasizing the 
particularities of each state and its societal context. The legitimacy approach therefore 
poses obstacles to measuring state strength in quantitative terms. Yet some indexes may 
help us to evaluate the degree of socio-political cohesion or the legitimacy of the central 
authorities. A good example might be the Afrobarometer project that studies public 
                                                 
53
 For example, Fukuyama states the possible benefits from ―a science, art, or techné to state-
building.‖ Fukuyama, State Building, 99.  
54
 David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 
5-6. 
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bureaucratic state power.‖ James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, 
Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994), xiv-xv. 
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opinion in various African countries, notably the citizens-government relationship.
57
 In 
general, a careful examination of a particular case study, including for example its past 
experience and the nature of the demands of the opposition (threatening the nature of the 
state or demands formulated inside the agreed national political framework), constitutes a 
first step to understand its stability as a political entity. The legitimacy approach can also 
be associated with some very interesting proposals, trying to reconcile the need for 
cultural sensitiveness on the one hand and enhancing international preparedness for crises 
outbreak.
58
 The proposal to create an interim legal code for ready use in post-conflict 
situations, one of the recommendations included in the Brahimi‘s report,59 also gave rise 
to an interesting proposals, some closer to the legitimacy approach, others not. For 
instance, tentative model codes have been designed, a solution that seems to play down 
the importance of culture in the conception of legal codes. However, as noted by Reyko 
Huang,  
 
it‘s not meant to be a ‗one-size-fits-all‘ to legislative reform; neither should it be 
imposed on a country by external actors. Rather it is intended to provide a simple, 
useful package of codes from which competent national authorities can select the 
appropriate legislation for their own country‘s legal framework. Intended to be 
readily applicable worldwide, the toolbox of codes represents a cross-cultural 
hybrid of civil, common and Islamic law.
60
 
 
  
However, on the other hand, legal experts identified at least seven major legal traditions 
in the world (catholic, talmudic, civil, islamic, common, hindu and Asian) and many 
more peripheral traditions which ―await investigation and recognition.‖61 Thus, Kofi 
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60
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61
 Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 344. 
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Annan‘s approach outlined in his report on the rule of law and transitional justice in 
conflict and post-conflict societies, seems more coherent with the legitimacy approach 
aforementioned. As he states, ―although the lessons of past transitional justice efforts help 
inform the design of future ones, the past can only serve as a guideline. Pre-packaged 
solutions are ill-advised.  Instead,  experiences  from  other  places  should  simply  be  
used  as  a starting point for local debates and decisions.‖62  
 
Defining legitimacy: from Weber to the institutionalists 
Thus far, our analysis may imply that tenants of the institutional approach do not 
mention legitimacy aspects of state collapse and state-building; actually, most of the time, 
they do. However, different conceptions of the state adopt different definitions of 
legitimacy. The distinction between both understandings of legitimacy here is subtle and 
brings us back to the state-society relationship. Following Anthony Giddens‘ point that 
the ―state‖ sometimes means an apparatus of government or power, sometimes the 
overall social system subject to that government or power, and given the fact that 
institutionalists tend to adopt the ―restrictive‖ conception of the state, they also naturally 
tend to be attracted to use a restrictive interpretation of legitimacy. 
 
The conception of the autonomous state, seen as differentiated from the society,
63
 
has long been equated with Weber‘s work, as publicized by such neo-Weberians as 
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 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN. Doc. S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 16. 
63
 The Weberian conception of the ―autonomous state‖ has had a huge impact in the state-building 
literature. For instance, Joel Migdal, a leading contributor to the state-society distinction, 
contends that ―the progress of state-building can be measured by the degree of development of 
certain instrumentalities whose purpose is to make the action of the state effective: bureaucracy, 
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Societies and Weak States : State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 35. However, Joel Migdal later put forth a different 
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work, he nevertheless proposed to abandon the Weberian inspired analysis of the state for he 
judges that it has hitherto disconnected theory from practice. Joel Migdal, State in Society: 
Studying How States and Societies Constitute Each Other (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). On a different front, Evenly Davidheiser also exemplifies this approach, arguing 
that ―in defining the state as an actor, it is more useful to focus on the structures which comprises 
the state.‖ She then offers three criteria for evaluating the strength of the state: depth of 
penetration of society by the state, breadth of penetration, and state autonomy, or penetration of 
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defines the state as ―the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that 
attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority but also to 
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Theda Skocpol, Randall Collins, Michael Mann or Charles Tilly.
64
 Whether this is an 
accurate interpretation of Weber‘s work is a question that remains open. For example, 
John Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke emphasized that ―the concept of pure ‗autonomous‘ 
state is often deemed to be synonymous with Weber. One of the reasons why this 
conception is equated with Weber is because it is deemed to be one of the leitmotifs of 
neo-Weberian scholarship.‖65 Other authors have asserted that we should understand 
Weber‘s political theory in conjunction with his other sociological works, particularly his 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
66
 Is it true that Weber‘s definition of 
politics is very broad: ―[it] comprises any kind of independent leadership in action;‖67 
however, as he continued in the same breath: ―we wish to understand by politics only the 
leadership, or the influencing of the leadership, of a political association, hence today, of 
a state.‖68 Thus, it could be argued that Weber‘s conception of politics, and political 
legitimacy, is closely linked to his own conception of the state.
69
   
 
If Weber is rightly regarded as one of the founding father of twentieth-century 
social science and if Weber‘s influence across a wide range of disciplines and subjects 
has been enormous, he is nevertheless considered by some authors as the source of the 
confusion regarding the concept of legitimacy.
70
 Weber conceives legitimacy as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
structure many crucial relationships within civil society itself.‖ Alfred Stepan, The State and 
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 Moreover, the Weberian conception of the state needs to be understood in conjunction with the 
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Marxist literature on the state. As Kate Nash observes, ―the autonomy of the political at the level 
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necessary condition and a means for a government to exercise authority over society. 
This could be done either by charismatic, traditional or rational-legal principles, to take 
up the three well-known ideal types presented by Weber
71
. In that sense, legitimacy 
principles are in fact principles of legitimization of the central authority. For Weber, the 
claim of legitimacy serves a bid for a justification of support, and its success consists not 
in fulfilling normative conditions but in being believed. Weber defines legitimacy as ―the 
prestige of being considered exemplary or binding,‖72 which led Hanna Pitkin to argue 
that ―Weber‘s definition is essentially equivalent to defining ‗legitimate‘ as ‗the condition 
of being considered legitimate,‘ and the corresponding ‗normative‘ definition comes out 
as ‗deserving to be considered legitimate.‘‖73 It is also on that ground that Peter Blau 
states that Weber ―takes the existence of legitimate authority for granted and never 
systematically examine the structural conditions under which it emerges out of other 
forms of power.‖74 Carl Friedrich affirms that statement, saying that Weber‘s analysis 
―assumes that any system of government is necessarily legitimate.‖75 Moreover, ―the 
Weberian definition not only misrepresents the role that beliefs play in legitimacy. In 
making legitimacy primarily a matter of belief, it also ignores those elements which are 
not really to do with beliefs at all.‖76 
 
Weber‘s conception of legitimacy has been quite influential, a good part of the 
social scientists in the twentieth century following Max Weber in defining legitimacy as 
                                                                                                                                                 
MacMillan, 1991), 8. However, he qualifies that statement later, when he writes that ―what is 
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 Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, tr. H. Secher (New York: Citadel Press, 1962), 72.  
73
 Hanna Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 281.  
74
 Peter Blau, ―Critical Remarks on Weber‘s Theory of Authority‖ in Max Weber, ed. Dennis 
Wrong (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 149. 
75
 Carl J. Friedrich, Man and his Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: 
McGray-Hill, 1963), 186. Friedrich argues that Weber actually confuses the concepts of 
legitimacy and authority (chapter 12-13, 216-246). Habermas agrees, stating in his debate with 
Luhmann that: ―the unobjectionable manner in which a norm comes into being, that is, the legal 
form of a procedure, guarantees as such only that the authorities which the political system 
provides for, and which are furnished with certain competencies and recognized as competent 
within that system, bear the responsibility for valid law. But these authorities are part of a system 
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the belief in legitimacy. For example, Seymour Lipset defines legitimacy of a political 
system as its capacity ―to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.‖77 Richard Merelman calls 
legitimacy ―a quality attributed to a regime by a population. That quality is the outcome 
of the government‘s capacity to engender legitimacy.‖78 Charles Tilly is also resolutely 
Weberian when he states that ―legitimacy depends rather little on abstract principle or 
assent of the governed. (…) Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to 
confirm the decisions of a given authority.‖79 As David Beetham caustically asserted, 
―taken to their logical conclusion, such definitions would imply that the reason for the 
collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 lay in a deficiency of 
public relations, rather than anything actually wrong with the system of rule itself.‖80 
 
The tenants of the institutional approach, following Weber steps, treat legitimacy 
either as a mere consequence of functioning institutions or as a process of legitimization. 
This naturally stems from the implicit Weberian approach of legitimacy; as Robert 
Grafstein states, summarizing incidentally the two aforementioned tendencies of the 
institutional approach: ―Weber virtually identifies legitimacy with stable and effective 
political power, reducing it to a routine submission to authority.‖81 
 
Rotberg is certainly a good example of the tendency to reduce legitimacy to a 
consequence of ―stable and effective political power.‖  Mentioning legitimacy only as 
consequence of good delivery of public goods, he argues that public goods ―give content 
to the social contract between ruler and ruled.‖82 The author notes that ―there is no failed 
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state without disharmonies between communities,‖83 but treats these ―disharmonies‖ as 
consequences of the failure of state institutions. In yet another article, the author 
mentioned that ―nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political 
goods to their people. Their governments lose legitimacy and, in the eyes and hearts of a 
growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate.‖84 Hence, 
legitimacy in that regard is treated as a natural by-product of successful state institutions. 
Once again, it all comes back to the definition of the state that one adopts. The author 
mentions that ―a nation-state also fails when it loses legitimacy, that is, when its nominal 
borders become irrelevant and autonomous control passes to groups within the national 
territory of the state, or sometimes even across its international borders.‖85 The Weberian 
definition of the state cannot be more emphasized in that regard.  
 
The other tendency, ―reducing legitimacy to a routine submission to authority,‖ is 
encompassed in Fukuyama‘s work, with the specific emphasis the author puts on 
democracy as a legitimizing factor for the institutionalization process in a weak state. 
Interestingly enough, Fukuyama‘s analysis, especially in his ―strength and scope‖ 
distinction, draws heavily from Samuel Huntington‘s seminal book Political Order in 
Changing Societies, which argues that ―the degree of community in a complex society 
depends on the strength and scope of its political institutions.‖86 However, for 
Huntington, the key to state stability is not the strength of the institutions per se, but the 
relationship between these institutions and the overarching society they are supposed to 
represent, as expressed through the ability of state authorities to generate a domestic 
consensus and a legitimate public order. This is a major distinction between the two 
authors. For Fukuyama, legitimacy is encompassed in the process of legitimization of the 
authority exercised by the government over society.
87
 According to him, the only viable 
and durable source of legitimacy in today‘s world is liberal democracy.88 For Huntington, 
legitimacy is itself an important criterion of state strength. 
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Hence, one can assert that insisting on the political concept of legitimacy allows us 
to concentrate our attention on the state and society as distinct in terms of ―actors‖ though 
not necessarily autonomous institutions and activities.
89
 As Alexander Wendt stated, 
―(…) it seems impossible to define the state apart from ―society.‖ States and societies 
seem to be conceptually interdependent in the same way that masters and slaves are, or 
teachers and students; the nature of each is a function of its relation to the other.‖90 In that 
regard, it appears crucial to understand state and society in their mutually constitutive 
relationship, where legitimacy conditions state strength and is, at the same time, an 
element of state strength.
91
 As Beetham stated, ―a given power relationship is not 
legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms 
of their beliefs.‖92 If no definition of legitimacy is optimal, we believe that Mary Kaldor‘s 
definition has the merits of being clear. She defines legitimacy as ―the extent to which 
people consent to and even support the framework of rules within which political 
institutions function, either because the political institutions are seen as having gained 
authority through some legitimate process, and/or because they are seen to represent 
ideas or values widely supported.‖93 
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Conclusion: The “more is better” approach and other avenues for state-building  
In the previous discussion, I tried to underscore the need to understand legitimacy 
of the outside intervention and the way an outside contributor can nurture and foster 
support for the operation among the local population. Indeed, external actors necessarily 
affect the socio-political process of the target state. It is not the case that nation-building 
implies interference while state-building focused on institutions does not; no matter how 
one defines the terms, an international intervention necessarily imply a degree of 
interference. In that regard, the common cliché saying that it is possible to undertake 
state-building without embarking in nation-building activities appears misguided.
94
 
Similarly, to use the theoretical distinction proposed earlier, the legitimacy and the 
institutional approaches both imply interference, however on their own specific terms. 
 
Except for some specific authors, there is a wide consensus that reconstruction of 
the sovereign state is necessary and that state collapse necessitates external assistance in a 
transitional period.
95
 As Zartman posits, ―it is necessary to provide a large, informally 
representative forum, and if the contenders for power do not do so, an external force to 
guarantee security and free expression during the legitimization process may be required. 
[…] In all three areas – power, participation, and resources – it is hard to get around the 
usefulness, if not the outright need, of external assistance.‖96 However, the exact nature 
                                                 
94
 Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ―Statebuilding Without Nationbuilding? Legitimacy, State-Failure and 
the Limits of the Institutional Approach,‖ Journal of Intervention and State-Building 3, no. 1 
(2009): 21-45. 
95
 See for instance those defending the theory of the ―fresh start.‖ Andreas Mehler and Claude 
Ribaux state that ―the collapse of states in crisis need not be prevented, since a ‗better state‘ 
cannot emerge until that collapse has taken place.‖ For Samuel Eisenstadt, ―collapse, far from 
being an anomaly, both in the real world and in social evolutionary theory, presents in dramatic 
form not the end of social institutions, but almost always the beginning of new ones.‖ Finally, 
Timothy Raeymaekers argues that ―we should start thinking hard about the possibility that state 
collapse presents a plausible, and perhaps even likely, outcome for some states in the system.‖ 
Andreas Mehler and Claude Ribaux, Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in Technical 
Cooperation: An Overview of the National and International Debate (Wiesbaden: Universum 
Verlangsanstalt / Deutsche Gesselschaft für Technische Zussamenarbeit, 2000), 107; Samuel 
Eisenstadt, ―Beyond Collapse,‖ in The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations, ed. Norman 
Yoffee and George Cowgill (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 243; Timothy 
Raeymaekers, ―Collapse or Order? Questionning State Collapse in Africa?‖ Conflict Research 
Group, Working Paper no. 1, May 2005, 7. See also: Martin Doornbos, ―State Collapse and Fresh 
Starts : Some Critical Reflections,‖ in State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction, ed. Jennifer 
Milliken, 45-62. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003; Nicholas van Hear, ―Re-Casting Societies in Conflict,‖ 
Center on Migration, Policy and Society, Oxford University, Working Paper no. 22, 2005; and 
the proponents of the laissez-faire approach: Luttwak, ―Give War a Chance‖ and Herbst, ―Let 
Them Fail.‖ 
96
 William Zartman, ―Putting Things Back Together‖ in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and 
Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 270-
272. The three areas the author refers to are 1) reconcentring central power (the powerful must be 
recognized as legitimate, or the legitimate must be made powerful); 2) increasing state legitimacy 
through participation; and 3) raising and allocating economic resources in support of peace.  
Copyright PSA 2010
24 
 
of this external assistance is still widely debated. One of the implications of the 
institutional approach‘s extensive influence over the state-building literature is the 
prescription that ―more is better‖ in terms of state-building, where ―the more intrusive the 
intervention, the more successful the outcome.‖97 This is a by-product of two tendencies 
of the institutional approach that we have broached earlier, which is either to isolate 
theoretically state-building operations from so-called nation-building activities, or to 
discard or ignore legitimacy aspects pertaining to state-building. 
 
One of the best examples of the ―more is better‖ framework is the widely-quoted 
RAND study on US-led state-building operations, directed by James Dobbins. The study 
identifies five case studies (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan), and 
contrasts these cases with the historic cases of Germany and Japan, that have according to 
them ―set a standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not since been equalled.‖98 
Their conclusion is that a high level of economic assistance and high numbers of troops 
deployed for a long time were crucial for the success of the two historic operations and 
can explain why recent operations showed little success: ―the higher level of input 
accounts in significant measure for the higher level of output measured in the 
development of democratic institutions and economic growth.‖99 Needless to say, the 
authors do not seem to acknowledge the sharp contextual differences existing between 
the cases, varying across nearly fifty years and taking place in substantially different 
international context.
100
 Moreover, the most recent study made by Dobbins et al., this 
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time on UN‘s role in nation-building and meant to complement their previous study, goes 
along the same lines. While the authors recognize that the UN has shown, mutatis 
mutandis, better results with a ―light-footprint‖ approach, they wrote that ―the United 
States would be well advised to leave the small footprint, low profile approach to the 
United Nations, and resume supersizing its nation-building missions.‖101 This 
prescription echoes Steven Ratner‘s remarks, when he said that ―interveners ought to err 
on the side of more rather than less even though the empirical evidence to date does not 
obviously support a more is better perspective.‖102 
 
State-building has significant limits when unrelated to the needs and perceptions of 
the local society targeted by the intervention - in that regard, more is not necessarily 
better. This is nothing surprising or new for researchers working on development issues, 
but it has to be restated in the wider context of state-building. Various studies have 
highlighted the limits of top-down approaches, especially in the context of Iraq,
103
 
Kosovo
104
 and Timor-Leste.
105
 Lessons drawn from these two last missions have also led 
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to the birth of a concept inside the organization, the ―light footprint approach‖ that came 
to be associated with the work of the UN official Lakhdar Brahimi. The light footprint 
approach - a term that was coined during the planning of the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) - advocates that UN activities should be limited to 
those that are appropriate to the local needs and context, and that international staff 
should be limited to the minimum required, with an effort to ensure local capacity-
building, so that nationals can take over from the UN as soon as possible. Hence, for 
David Malone, ―Brahimi‘s approach is designed in reaction to many things he did not 
like in East Timor and Kosovo, mainly the idea of the UN governing, rather than 
assisting local leaderships in governing.‖106 It does not mean the end of intervention, it 
rather implies a different form of exercising authority in a foreign setting: ―to underscore 
the primacy of local over foreign concerns in no way means that the international partners 
have to accept the views of the local parties unconditionally and without discussion. But 
it does mean that arrogance is not acceptable, and humility and genuine respect for the 
local population indispensable.‖107 
 
Hence, the goal here is to prevent the establishment of what David Chandler 
dubbed ―phantom states,‖ whose governing institutions may have extensive external 
resourcing but lack social or political legitimacy.
108
 As noted by Marina Ottaway, 
outsiders can set up governmental organizations, but ―such organizations will only 
become significant and established – hence institutions – when the relevant actors believe 
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that they provide solutions to real problems.‖109 The imposition of solutions from a top-
down perspective can be effective only to a certain extent – it can certainly contribute to a 
restoration of peace and order, a negative peace to use Galtung‘s terminology, but has 
definite limitations in terms of state-building more broadly defined, as this study has 
attempted to demonstrate.
110
 In this context, there is a genuine need to find a durable 
solution, where legitimacy conceptions from the inside are taken into account. The 
concept of ―participatory intervention‖ could provide an interesting way to alleviate some 
of the most troubling aspects linked to state-building processes.
111
 However, it entails a 
significant normative shift on the part of a segment of the international community and 
the Academia, from the institutional and restrictive approach to a more comprehensive 
approach of state-building processes. 
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